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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY & CASUALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

No. 16126

JAMSHID MARDANLOU,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by Prudential Property &
Casualty Insurance Company for declaratory relief pursuant
to §78-33-1 et seq., Utah Code Annotated (1953) seeking to
rescind a renter's (homeowner's) policy because of material
misrepresentations made by the defendant when applying for
said insurance.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After a non-jury trial, the District Court of Salt Lake
County, James

s.

Sawaya, Judge, determined that the policy

of insurance was void, rescinded the policy, and entered a

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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judgment providing that plaintiff was relieved from any
further obligation to defendant.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks affirmance of the trial court's
decision.
FACTS
Respondent disagrees with appellant's statement of the
facts.

Appellant states the facts in a light favorable to

appellant and contrary to the findings of the trial court;
appellant's recitation of the facts is argumentative.

Ac-

cordingly, respondent will set forth a detailed chronological
statement of the facts.

References are to Exhibit Numbers,

pages of depositions or statements, to the record, and in
referring to the trial transcript, the transcript page
designated "T".
The argumentative nature of appellant's statement of
facts is well illustrated on page 4 of Appellant's Brief
wherein it is stated that "the appellant is an Iranian
citizen who has English language difficulties".

Reference

is made to three pages of the Transcript wherein the appellant made self-serving statements to the effect that he did
not understand the questions being asked of him.

The clear

weight of the evidence, however, was to the contrary.
Aetna adjuster (Mr. Oslowski) who negotiated the first

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The

burglary loss testified (T-145) that he had several face-toface meetings with the defendant and that while there were
some language difficulties "he spoke relatively good English.
I think we were basically able to communicate".

Prudential's

agent (Mr. Ferguson) testified that he had no difficulty
communicating with the defendant (T-66).

A year before,

when defendant applied for the Aetna policy he discussed the
matter over the telephone with Linda Messerly, an employee
of Ed D. Smith & Sons which was the local agent for Aetna.
She had no problem in communicating with him (T-37).

It

should be observed that the defendant had been in the
United States for six years (at the time of the trial)

had

a Ph.D. in physicial education from the University of Utah,
and had taught classes at the University (T-3-4).

Defendant

admitted that when he was discussing the insurance with
Prudential's agent that there was no confusion (T-171) and
that he recalls no language difficulties nor the need for an
interpreter (although one was available) at the time his
statement was taken in April, 1977 (T-191).

Further, the

trial court made a specific finding that the defendant was
conversant in the English language and could speak, write
and understand same (R-84).
The crucial facts of this case may be summarized as
follows:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(1)

In October, 1975 the defendant applied for and

received a binder of homeowner's insurance from Aetna
Insurance Company.
(2)

A few days later he reported a suspicious burglary

and the loss of $8,600.00 of personal property.
(3)

That he made claim against Aetna Insurance Company,

which was disputed; defendant complained at one time to the
State Insurance Commissioner regarding Aetna's handling of
the claim.
(4)

Aetna cancelled his insurance policy and later

compromised his claim for approximately $5,000.00
(5)

That defendant knew he had been cancelled by

Aetna.
(6)

Less than one year later, on October 6, 1976,

defendant applied for a similar policy of insurance with the
appellant.

Appellant's agent, Lloyd D. Ferguson, asked him

certain questions and based upon defendant's responses
completed an application which the defendant signed.
(7)

That appellant's agent asked him about prior

losses, prior insurance, and whether he had ever been
cancelled.
(8)

That defendant did not disclose to the agent that

he had been insured by and/or cancelled by Aetna, nor did he
disclose another prior loss.
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(9)

That defendant had ample opportunity to review the

application and in fact later pointed out to the agent an
error in the inception date of the policy, however, defendant
did not advise the agent of the inaccuracy of the statements
regarding prior insurance or prior losses.
(10)

That in reliance upon the information furnished

by defendant the agent bound coverage and subsequently a
policy was issued by the Prudential Insurance Company.
(11)

Approximately ten days later defendant sustained a

loss on account of a mysterious fire and made claim against
the respondent.
(12)

That respondent's general underwriting policies

and guidelines, and particularly those written instructions
given to agents, prohibit an agent from binding coverage
when the applicant had been cancelled within the last year.
That if the true facts had been known to respondent, it
would not have insured the defendant.
THE AETNA CLAIM
On October 2, 1975, the defendant called the Ed D. Smith
Insurance Agency and talked with Linda Messerly (T-7,24-26).
He requested coverage on certain unscheduled personal property and she prepared a binder.

The binder was sent to the

defendant at the address he gave her on October 2, 1975 (T-32).
On October 7, 1975, the defendant called Ed D. Smith Agency
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a second time and asked if two Persian rugs would also be
covered under the policy and when informed that they would
not in absence of a separate binder, he ordered the additional coverage (T-7-8).

Both binders were mailed to him on

October 2 and October 7, 1975, respectively, and he received
both binders in the mail (T-7, 8, 32).
On the evening of October 8, the defendant allegedly
sustained a burglary loss and reported that loss to the
agency the next day, October 9 (T-8,9).

Thereafter, the

defendant dealt with a Mr. Oslowski, a claims adjuster for
Aetna, and met with him on several occasions attempting to
negotiate the claim (T-9, 11; Deposition of Mr. Oslowski,
page 8-10).
Exhibit P-5 consists of a folder containing miscellaneous documents prepared by the Ed D. Smith Agency.

Copies of

the binders were mailed in the ordinary course of business
and so far as the Agency's records show, were received by
the defendant.

The defendant did not pay the agreed premium

and Ed D. Smith sent out nine separate billings (before
writing off the account), all of which were apparently received with one exception (the billing of October 9, 1975),
which may have been returned because the complete address
was not visible through the window in the envelope.
On October 17, 1975, Linda Messerly sent a letter to
Mr. Mardanlou advising him that the insurance policy had
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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been cancelled by Aetna for underwriting reasons.

Miss

Messerly had been instructed to cancel the policy by Aetna.
At that time, the defendant was not overdue in payment of
the premium (T-34-36).
Appellant contends that the cancellation letter was
mailed to the wrong address and denies receiving it.

The

cancellation letter, however, was sent to 422 South 1200
East, Apartment No. 19, which was the address that he
first gave to Miss Messerly over the telephone.

Appellant

claimed at the trial that he was living at Apartment No. 9.
However, he admits that he received both the original
homeowner's policy binder and also the "valuable items
policy" binder (T-7, 8) both of which show his address as
Apartment 19.

The nine billings were all mailed to Apart-

ment 19 and, as above indicated, only one was ever returned
by the post office.

Significantly, the cancellation letter

was never returned (T-33).
The defendant's negotiations with Oslowski regarding
the first burglary went on for several months.

In fact,

defendant complained to the insurance commissioner regarding
Aetna's handling of his claim (T-12-13).

Defendant executed

a proof of loss on November 18, 1975 (Exhibit P-2) making
claim for $8,604.00.

On January 29, 1976, defendant exe-

cuted two releases (Exhibit P-3) and received two checks
totaling $5,485.00 (Exhibit P-4).
-7Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Defendant admits that the Aetna claims adjuster, Mr.
Oslowski, told him sometime between mid-October and the end
of January that he was cancelled (T-13, 14, 167, 189, 190).
Defendant also submitted an affidavit in connection with the
instant lawsuit wherein he stated that he heard a "oral
rumor" that part of the policy had been cancelled (R-68).
Homeowner's policies are written normally for a minimum
of three months and most commonly for a period of one year
(Deposition of Mr. Oslowski, pages 13-14).

Defendant ad-

mitted that when he applied for the Aetna policy he intended
to be insured for one year (T-15).

However, the proof of

loss which he admittedly signed (P-2) and the checks which
he admitted he cashed (P-4) reflected on their face
that both the homeowner's policy and the endorsement
expired prior to the end of October, 1975.
While Mr. Oslowski did not know the exact reason why
the Aetna underwriting office instructed the agent to cancel the policies, there would usually be only two reasons
therefor.

First, nonpayment of premium, or secondly,

the suspicious nature of the loss and general underwriting
considerations (Deposition of Mr. Oslowski, pages 29-30).
As indicated, however, Linda Messerly testified that defendant was not overdue in payment of premiums as of October
17, the date of the cancellation letter (T-36).
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THE APPLICATION WITH PRUDENTIAL
Lloyd Ferguson was the insurance salesman for Prudential.

On October 6, 1976, he met the defendant at the

physical education department at the University of Utah
(T-5, 49).

The defendant was first interested in obtaining

automobile insurance but when Mr. Ferguson learned that the
defendant had not had any automobile insurance for the last
30 days, he told him that Prudential would not consider
issuing him a policy.

Thereafter, they discussed home-

owner' s or renter's insurance.

The defendant was interested

in such insurance because he had some valuable Persian rugs,
and wanted them insured for a total of $15,000.00 (T-5S).
Mr. Ferguson then started completing the "application for
homeowner's policy" (Exhibit P-1).

The application requires

information regarding past addresses, marital status,
employer, etc.

The significant items for the purposes of

this litigation are as set forth in paragraphs SA and SB,
which make inquiry regarding prior homeowner's insurance
history and prior losses.

Mr. Ferguson specifically asked

the defendant whether any insurance company had cancelled,
refused to renew or declined acceptance during the last
three years; the defendant answered "no" to each question
(T-55).

When Mr. Ferguson asked him about prior losses, the

defendant first stated no, and then admitted that he had a

-9-
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loss at his prior address a year before but that he had lost
only some "minor items" such as gloves, goggles and ski
poles.

At no time did the defendant give any indication of

the magnitude of the prior loss nor did he ever give any
indication that he had had a policy of insurance with Aetna
(T-56, 61-62, 81).
The defendant identified Exhibit P-1 and acknowledged
that he had signed it up at the University (T-4-5).

He was

furnished a copy of the application which he took home with
him.

A few days later, while reading over the application,

he noticed that Mr. Ferguson had inadvertently written
in 12-01-76 as the inception date of the policy, when the
inception date should have been 10-06-76 (T-15, 159, 178).
He called Mr. Ferguson and told him about the error and told
him to change it otherwise he was going to cancel the policy
(T-178).

At no time, however, did defendant ever advise Mr.

Ferguson or any other agent of Prudential that in fact he
had been previously insured with Aetna and that he had been
cancelled (T-61, 178).
Defendant admitted to the burglary loss in October,
1975, and that admission is reflected in paragraph BB of the
application.

However, as above indicated, the defendant did

not disclose the magnitude of that loss.

It further appears

that defendant failed to advise the agent of yet another
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loss which occurred in California some time within the prior
three years (T-18, 157).
Thereafter, Mr. Ferguson corrected the application form
and delivered a corrected copy to Mr. Mardanlou and then
submitted the application to Prudential for the issuance
of a policy (T-61, 66).

Shortly thereafter the defendant's

apartment was badly damaged by a fire of mysterious origin
on October 19, 1976, and he made claim against Prudential
(T-19-20).
MATERIALITY OF THE MISREPRESENTATION
Prudential's agent, Lloyd Ferguson, was delegated a
certain amount of "binding authority", which meant that
under some circumstances he could bind coverage without
approval from the regional office of Prudential (which in
this case was in Phoenix, Arizona) (T-46).

However, there

were several restrictions upon his binding authority and he
was not authorized to bind coverage if the applicant had
been declined, refused renewal or cancelled within 12 months
by any other company or if there had been more than two
losses during the last three years (T-47, 48, 62-64).
Mr. Ferguson identified and explained the contents of
an 11-page folder referred to in the industry as an "HR-10",
"selection of homeowner's risks", which was admitted as
plaintiff's Exhibits P-6.

That document was in effect in
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October of 1976 and governed the agent's binding authority.
It specifically provides that "coverage may
when one of the following conditions exist".

~

be bound

The document

then lists seven restrictions including value and amount of
insurance, the nature of the structure, the location of the
structure, the nature of the ownership or occupancy, the
amount of scheduled personal property and whether outboard
motors and boats are involved.

Specifically, under subsec-

tion E entitled "insurance history", it is provided that
coverage may not be bound when "there have been more than
two losses of any kind within the last 36 months . •

" and

"during the last 12 months an insurance company has declined, cancelled or refused to renew similar insurance for
underwriting reasons

.."

Exhibit P-6 further provides

that a certain amount of flexibility is permitted, even if
an applicant had been cancelled within the last 12 months;
it is provided, however, that such an applicant may not be
bound but that the agent may send an inquiry form to the
regional office of Prudential where a decision will be made
whether to issue a policy.

Mr. Ferguson testified, however,

that if he had known that the defendant had been cancelled
for underwriting reasons, that he wouldn't even have taken
an application (T-84).

Exhibit P-6 further provides that

any such inquiry form, even if sent, would have to be mailed
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to the regional service office of Prudential in Phoenix 30
days prior to the date coverage is desired.
Bill Zimmerman is the Associate Underwriting Manager
at the Western Regional Service Office in Phoenix, Arizona.
In his position he makes the rules regarding underwriting
decisions and is not bound by the HR-10 (Exhibit P-6), and
he can make exceptions to the rules (T-110-111).

Agents or

salesmen such as Mr. Ferguson, however, are bound by the
rules set forth in the HR-10 (T-111).

He confirmed that if

the applicant had admitted to the prior cancellation by
Aetna that Mr. Ferguson could not have bound coverage
(T-117-118).

If an inquiry had been made, and Mr. Zimmerman

had known of the prior cancellation, he would have had the
authority to nevertheless issue a policy, but he would not
have done so (T-118-119).

He also confirmed that based upon

his knowledge of the industry in general that a standard
line insurance company such as Prudential would not have
insured the defendant if they had known of his prior cancellation by Aetna and that a high-risk or substandard
company would probably not have written such insurance, or
that if they did, the rate would have been perhaps 10 or 20
times as great as the premium quoted by a standard company
(T-122-123).
In summary, it was clearly established without dispute
at the time of trial that Prudential Insurance Company would
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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not have insured the defendant if he had disclosed the prior
cancellation by Aetna.
CREDIBILITY OF DEFENDANT
Appellant argues that he did not know that he had been
cancelled, that he never received any written communications
from Aetna advising him of that fact,

that he had English

language difficulties, that he made full disclosure to Mr.
Ferguson and that he did not intend to defraud or mislead
Prudential or its agent.

The argument is thus made that the

trial court should have believed the defendant and not the
other witnesses.
Respondent suggests that the following factors, among
others, justified the court in believing the other witnesses
and discounting the credibility of the defendant.
The trial judge had ample opportunity to evaluate the
demeanor of the defendant and the substance of his testimony
both on direct and cross examination.

In addition, a re-

ported statement, under oath, was taken of the defendant
on April 21, 1977, said statement admitted into evidence as
plaintiff's Exhibit P-10.

In addition, defendant filed an

affidavit in connection with this lawsuit found at page 65
of the record.

Various discrepancies and inconsistencies ap-

pear therefrom including, but not limited to, the following.
At page 74-75 of his statement, he denies making any
claims of any type to any insurance company since 1972, with
-14-
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the exception of a workmen's compensation claim in California.

On page 78 of the statement, on the other hand, he

admits that he made a claim against Aetna.
At page 80 of his statement, he stated that he knew
that Aetna had cancelled, and that they did it like Prudential Insurance Company and "the same way the insurance
companies do".

At the trial he testified that Mr. Oslowski,

the Aetna claims adjuster, had told him verbally that "you
do not have any more insurance" (T-13-14).

In his affi-

davit, however, he claims that he had only heard an oral
rumor that "part of the policy had been cancelled" (R-68).
At page 22 of his statement (P-10), he stated that
Ferguson had asked him if he had had a prior homeowner's
policy but did not recall whether Ferguson asked if a
policy had been cancelled.

He testified at the time of

trial that Ferguson did not ask him about prior insurance
companies or whether he had been cancelled (T-156), contrary
to his testimony and his statement of April 21, 1977 (P-10),
and at variance with other testimony which he gave at the
time of trial, for example where he testified that he had
told Ferguson that Aetna had cancelled his policy "half and
half" (T-18).
Without belaboring the point, a careful reading of
the Defendant's Affidavit, his statement (P-10) and his

-15-
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testimony at the time of trial indicates that he gave several different versions of the critical events.

First,

that he knew that he had been cancelled by Aetna, or that he
did not know that he had been cancelled by Aetna, or that he
thought he had been cancelled "half and half".

Second,

that Ferguson asked him about prior cancellations and that
defendant made full disclosure of the Aetna cancellation,
or that Ferguson did not ask, and the defendant told him
anyway, or that Ferguson did ask and defendant told him but
that Ferguson did not care, or that Ferguson did not ask
and that defendant did not tell him.
The trial judge could have been influenced by defendant's claims that he only received those documents in the
mail which were beneficial to his position, and denied
receiving other documents, sent to the same address,
which were not helpful.

His claim of English language

difficulty is rebutted by the testimony of other witnesses
and, of course, the trial court was in the best position to
evaluate the defendant's language ability.
ARGUMENT
I

THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS.
In reviewing the evidence in this case, certain basic
principles of appellate review are applicable:
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1.

Disputed facts must be reviewed in the light

most favorable to the judgment entered in the trial court,
Smith v. Gallegos, 400 P.2d 570, 16 Utah 2d 344.
2.

The judgment of the trial court is presumed

to be correct, Robinson v. Hreinson, 409 P.2d 121, 17 Utah
2d 261.
3.

It is the perogative of the trial court

to determine what aspects of the evidence he will believe
and the court may be selective and choose those portions of
the testimony of any witness which it thinks has the greater
probability of being true.

The trial court is the exclusive

judge of the credibility of witnesses and is not obliged to
believe testimony in which there is any inherent frailty.
including self-interest, Cannon v. Wright, 531 P.2d 1290
(Utah 1975); People's Finance v. Dornan, 497 P.2d 17 (Utah
197 2).
4.

On review, findings and judgment of the

trial court will be sustained if supported by any substantial evidence and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.

In order to reverse a trial court, the evidence must

be such that all reasonable minds would not have found as
the trial court found, Centurion Corp. v. Fiberchern, Inc.,
562 P.2d 1252 (Utah 1977); Jensen v. Eddy, 514 P.2d 1142
(Utah 1973).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-17-

5.

The Supreme Court will not disturb findings of

the trial court unless the trial court has misapplied proven
facts or made findings of fact clearly contrary to the weight
of the evidence.

The trial court's determination of find-

ings of fact should normally stand, even though the Supreme
Court might disagree.

The advantaged position of the trial

court, that is, close proximity to witnesses and the trial,
should be given substantial consideration, De Vas v. Noble,
369 P.2d 290 (Utah 1962); Valley Bank v. First Security
Bank, 538 P.2d 298 (Utah 1975); First Security Bank v. Hall,
504 P.2d 995 (Utah 1972).
Respondent respectfully submits that each of the
trial court's findings were based on substantial, competent
and admissible evidence.

The trial court's findings of

fact are found at R-79 and for convenience are restated
herein, with brief reference to the evidence supporting the
findings:
(1)
That on October 6, 1976, the defendant
applied for a policy of homeowner's (renter's)
insurance through plaintiff's agent, Lloyd
Ferguson.
That the plaintiff's agent asked the
defendant certain questions necessary to complete
the application including, inter alia, questions
relating to defendant's past loss and past insurance history.
Both the defendant and Ferguson so testified, the
only conflict being defendant's on-again, off-again claim
that Ferguson did not ask him about prior insurance.

-18-
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The

trial court, however, believed Mr. Ferguson's version of
the events.
(2) Plaintiff's agent, based upon facts
to him b~ defendant, completed the application form and included therein the information
that (a) the defendant had not been cancelled
declined acceptance, nor refused to renew by '
any company within the last three years, and (b)
defend~nt had no p:ior losses except a burglary of
a few items of nominal value from his residence at
422 South 1200 East, Salt Lake City, in October,
1975, and (c) defendant had no previous homeowner's
insurance and had made no previous claims.

g~ven

The testimony of both the defendant and Mr. Ferguson,
and the application itself (Exhibit P-1) support this
finding.
(3) That thereafter, the defendant signed
the application ce-tifying that the declarations
and statements therein were complete and true to
the best of his knowledge and belief and that the
company (plaintiff) could rely upon them in the
issuance of any policy based upon said application.
Defendant admits that he signed Exhibit P-1; the
certification that the statements made in the application
are true is printed on the application form immediately over
defendant's signature.
(4) That a copy of the application was delivered to and furnished to the defendant. That
within a few days after October 6, 1976, the defendant read over the application in detail and
noted an error in the application relating to
the effective date of the policy, and that defendant called the existence of the error to the
attention of plaintiff's agent who thereafte:, at
the request of defendant, corrected the appl~ca
t ion in the particular complained of and delivered a corrected copy to defendant. That at no
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time did defendant advise the plaintiff or any of
plaintiff's agents of any errors, misrepresentations, omissions, concealment of facts or incorrect statements contained in said application at
any time prior to the subsequent fire of October 19,
1976.
Defendant admitted that he read over the application
and advised Mr. Ferguson of the error regarding the inception date.

He admits that he did not advise Mr. Ferguson of

any of the other misstatements or errors set forth in the
application.
(5)
That in reliance upon the truth and
accuracy of the information contained in the
application and furnished to him by defendant,
plaintiff's agent bound coverage effective October
6, 1976 and subsequently, in reliance upon the
information contained in the application, the
regional service office of Prudential issued its
homeowner's policy No. 51-6H148371.
There was no dispute as to this finding.
and Mr.

Mr. Ferguson

Zimmerman so testified.

(6)
That on approximately October 19,
1976, defendant allegedly sustained a loss of
certain personal property as a result of a fire at
938 East 3rd South Street, Salt Lake City, and
subsequently made claim against plaintiff for the
loss of certain items of personal property,
including but not limited to, at least three
valuable Persian rugs having an alleged value in
excess of $15,000.00.
There was no dispute as to this finding.

Defendant so

testified.
(7)
That the application contained, inter
alia, the following misrepresentations, omissions,
concealment of facts and incorrect statements:
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. (a) That defendant had only had one
prior loss, to wit, a relatively minor
burglary of a few items of nominal value from
defendant's residence at 422 South 1200 East
Salt Lake City, in October, 1975.
'
In fact, defendant had had another
burglary loss within three years while
residing in California, and in addition, the
Salt Lake burglary of October, 1975, involved
a large amount of property having a value
claimed by defendant in excess of $8,000.00.
(b) That defendant had not had previous
homeowner's insurance and had not made claim
against another insurance company.
In fact, defendant had had a policy of
similar insurance with Aetna Life & Casualty
Company in October of 1975, had submitted a
proof of loss to Aetna for approximately
$8,600.00, which proof of loss was denied by
Aetna and ultimately compromised for approximately $5,500.00. That defendant had had a
substantial dispute with Aetna regarding the
settlement of the burglary claim in October,
1975, resulting in, inter alia, defendant's
complaint to the Utah State Insurance Commissioner regarding Aetna's handling of his
claim, and the cancellation of his insurance
policies with Aetna.
(c) That during the three years prior
to October 6, 1976, that the defendant had
not been cancelled, refused renewal, nor
declined acceptance, by any company.
In fact, defendant called an agent
of Aetna, Ed o. Smith & Sons Insurance
Agency, on October 2, 1975 and requested
a verbal binder of homeowner's or renter's
insurance. Coverage was bound by Aetna's
agent. On October 7, 1975, defendant called
Ed o. Smith & Sons and inquired whether
Persian rugs would be covered under that
policy and when advised that they w~uld need
to be scheduled, requested and receiv~d a
binder specifically insuring the Persian
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rugs. On October 9, the defendant reported
a burglary of various items of personal
property, including the rugs, to Ed o. Smith,
said burglary allegedly occurring on October
8, 1975. Thereafter, his policies of insurance with Aetna were cancelled by Aetna
Insurance Company which instructed Ed D.
Smith & Sons to advise defendant of said
cancellation.
That defendant was advised of
the cancellation of his Aetna policies by
virtue of, inter alia, a letter directed to
him from Ed D. Smith & Sons dated October 17,
1975, verbal advice received from a claims
representative of Aetna Insurance Company and
written indication of the short-term expiration of his policies as set forth on the
proof of loss and on the face of two drafts
issued to defendant by Aetna.
That defendant
well knew he had been cancelled by Aetna
prior to applying for insurance with plaintiff on October 6, 1976. That cancellation
of defendant's Aetna policies was not the
result of nonpayment of premium nor any
termination of Aetna's agency relationship
with Ed D. Smith & Sons, but rather because
of the unusual nature of defendant's alleged
loss and claim against Aetna.
Defendant admits to the other burglary in California
and that he did not so advise Ferguson.

He admits that the

loss in Salt Lake in October, 1975, was for approximately
$8,600.00.

Ferguson testified that defendant did not advise

him of the magnitude of that burglary loss.

His dealings

with Aetna are confirmed by the defendant's own admissions,
and by the testimony of Mr. Oslowski and Linda Messerly.
The findings are further supported by Exhibits P-1, 2, 3,
4 and 5.
(8)
That at all times herein material, and
specifically prior to October 6, 1976, the defendant well knew all of the above, and knew that
-22-
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tho~e.facts would be relevant to the plaintiff's

~ecision wh7ther or not to bind coverage or to

issu7 a poli7y, but that nevertheless defendant

kn~wingly, willfully and intentionally concealed

said fa~ts from.the plaintiff and the plaintiff's
agent with the intent to deceive and defraud
plaintiff and to induce it to bind coverage and
issue a policy of insurance.
There is no doubt but that the defendant well knew all
of the facts contained in findings number 7 and 8.

That he

did so willfully and with the intent to deceive and defraud
is a reasonable inference to be drawn from the circumstances
of the case.

Mr. Ferguson and Mr. Zimmerman testified

without dispute that the representations on the application
induced Prudential to bind coverage and that Prudential
would not have done so if the true facts had been known.
(9) That plaintiff relied upon the false
representations made by defendant and plaintiff's
agent accordingly bound the coverage and the
plaintiff ultimately issued its policy of insurance based upon said application. That the
misrepresentations, omissions, concealment of
facts and incorrect statements were fraudulent
material to the acceptance of the risk by the
plaintfiff, and that the plaintiff's agent would
not have bound coverage if the true facts had been
disclosed and that plaintiff would not have issued
its policy if the true facts had been known. That
the plaintiff, acting in good faith, and reasonably
and naturally and in accordance with the usual
practice among insurance companies under circumstances such as existed here would not have bound
coverage or issued the policy, and wou~d hav7 .
rejected the application of defendant if plaintiff
had known the true facts.
Mr. Ferguson and Mr. Zimmerman so testified.

Defendant

put on no evidence that Prudential, or any other insurance

-23-
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company, would have insured the defendant if he had disclosed
the facts of the prior cancellation.
(10)
That the defendant was conversant in
the English language and could speak, read, write
and understand same, that defendant was not prevented in any way from reading the application,
that defendant had ample opportunity to read
said application and did in fact read and sign
said application prior to the alleged loss of
October 19, 1976.
This finding is supported by the defendant's own
admissions and by the testimony of Mr. Oslowski, Miss
Messerly and Lloyd Ferguson.
(11)
That defendant intentionally, knowingly and willfully concealed material facts from
plaintiff which he knew were material to plaintiff's acceptance of the risk, that plaintiff in
good faith would nnt have accepted the risk if it
had known of the true facts, and that plaintiff
was not advised of the true nature of the misrepresentation, omissions, concealment of facts and
incorrect statements in advance of issuance of
the policy or in advance of the loss of October
19, 1976.
That Prudential was never advised of the prior cancellation prior to the fire was not disputed.

The findings of

intent and willfulness are reasonable inferences drawn from
the facts of the case.

The evidence was undisputed that

Prudential would not have accepted the risk if it had known
of the true facts.

-24-
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II
THE COURT'S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
WERE IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE LAW.
The statute which governs cases of this nature is
§31-19-8 Utah Code Annotated (1953).

That statute provides

in relevant part that
All statements and descriptions in any
application for an insurance policy • • • shall be
deemed to be representations and not warranties.
Misrepresentations, omissions, concealment of
facts and incorrect statements shall not prevent a
recovery under the policy or contract unless:
{a)

Fraudulent; or

(b) Material either to the acceptance
of the risk, or to the hazard assumed by the
insurer; or
(c) The insurer in good faith either
would not have issued the policy • • • or
would not have issued . • . it at the same
premium rate, or would not have issued (it)
• • . in as large an amount, or would not
have provided coverage with respect to the
hazard resulting in the loss, if the true
facts had been made known to the insurer as
required either by the application for the
policy or contract or otherwise.
It should be noted that the statute speaks in the
alternative, that is, a misrepresentation or omission will
prevent recovery under the policy of insurance if fraudulent, or material to the acceptance of the risk,

~

the

insurer in good faith would not have issued the policy at
all, or at the same rate.

-25-
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The following brief chronological analysis of Utah and
Tenth Circuit cases may be helpful to the court in setting
forth prior interpretations of the statute, and prior court
decisions under common law.
The first case found which deals with this issue is
Chadwick v. Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 181 P.448 (Utah 1919).
The beneficiary brought an action against the company to
recover under a policy of life insurance.

The company de-

fended upon the basis that certain misrepresentations had
been made by the insured as to whether he had a lifethreatening condition.

The trial court directed a verdict

for the insurance company.

The Supreme Court reversed

because there were factual questions relating to whether the
insured in fact knew that he had a life-threatening condition, whether he was in fact asked by the agent, and whether
either the insured or the agent knew that he (the insured)
had any disease and the seriousness thereof.

The court

observed that the evidence was sufficient to support a
jury verdict for either party.

The court adopts the view

that in order to defeat coverage, an insurance company would
need to prove that the statements made by the insured were
untrue and that the insured knew or should have known them
to be untrue at the time they were made.
The next case found which was decided on this question
is Eklund v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 57 P.2d 362 (Utah
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1936).

The Utah Supreme Court affirmed a directed verdict

for the insurance company where the deceased had represented
that she had no prior diseases, specifically cancer, and
denied any prior treatment by doctors.

In fact, she was

suffering from cancer and, presumably, knew it.

It was held

that the statements made to the company were material to the
risk and must have been knowingly false.

Since there was

only one reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom, a
directed verdict for the company was proper.
In 1938 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided
Zolintakis v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 97 F.2d 583 (10th
Cir. 1938).

The District Court had directed a verdict for

the company and the Tenth Circuit reversed.

While it

appeared that the deceased had misrepresented his age,
address, occupation and •good morals", it further appeared
that age was irrelevant by the policy provisions, that the
address and the insured's occupation were essentially
truthful and in any event not material, that is, that
neither the address nor the occupation made the risk any
more hazardous.

There was no evidence that the company

would not have insured him if it had known the true facts.
The Tenth Circuit cites Chadwick v. Beneficial Life Ins.
Co., supra, for the proposition that
A misrepresentation will.not co~stitute a
defense to an action on a policy of insurance
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unless it was intentionally untrue or was made
with a reckless disregard for its truth or
falsity.
Where an insured knowingly makes a
material misrepresentation, proof of an actual,
conscious purpose to deceive is not necessary.
A material fact is any fact, the knowledge or
ignorance of which would naturally influence the
insurer's judgment in making the contract, in
estimating the degree and character of the risk,
or in fixing the rate of insurance.
97 F.2d at
586.
North American Accident Ins. Co. v. Tebbs, 107 F.2d
853 {10th Cir. 1939) affirmed a jury verdict in favor of the
insured.

The insurance company had claimed that the insured

had misrepresented a prior declination of similar insurance.

The evidence established that the insured truthfully

disclosed prior applications but that he denied they had
been declined.

However, the evidence was that the applica-

tions were conditional and the jury found that the insured
did not know they had been declined.

It was held that the

jury's verdict was supported by substantial evidence.
In 1940 the Tenth Circuit decided Zolintakis v. Equitable
Life Assur. Soc., 108 F.2d 902 {10th Cir. 1940) a second time.
The jury, on a special verdict, found that the representations regarding residence and occupation were not strictly
true, but that they were not knowingly and intentionally
untrue nor made with the intent to defraud.

Again, the

court pointed out that there was conflicting evidence and
inferences regarding both representations, and that it was
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questionable whether they were even material, and specifically a jury finding of no knowing concealment.
facts, the insured was entitled to prevail.

Under those

The court

notes, however, that
One cannot knowingly conceal or misrepresent
facts which one knows would influence the risk or
the issuance of the policy, and then be heard to
say that he did not intend to deceive or defraud,
108 F.2d at 906.
In New York Life Ins. Co. v. Grow, 135 P.2d 120 (Utah
1943) the Supreme Court affirmed a judgment for the insured
where the company disputed coverage, claiming that the insured had failed to disclose the existence of heart disease.
However, there was

evid~nce

known of his condition.

that the insured may not have

There was evidence that the appli-

cation was not read to him and that he did not read it.
had a confusing medical history.

He

The evidence showed that

the agent may not have asked, and if he did, that he was
told of the problem by the insured but that the agent did
not inquire further.

While the insured signed the appli-

cation, there was no evidence he had read it.

Prior to

the loss, the agent was told about an aggravation of the
insured's heart condition, but the agent did not change the
application because "it was not important."

The court

reaffirmed the rule in Chadwick, observing that since the
company had failed to prove a knowing misrepresentation,
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and that no intent to defraud was shown, the verdict was
supported by the evidence.

Chief Justice Wolfe noted that

evidence that the representations made were untrue and that
the insured knew or should have known they were untrue,
would ordinarily be sufficient proof of the fact that they
were fraudulent, that is, that the insured intended to
deceive.

Justice McDonough observed that a finder of fact

could not find an absence of intent to defraud where the
applicant knowingly misrepresented facts which he knew or
should have known would have influenced the insurer in
accepting the risk.
Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. Middlemiss, 135
P.2d 275 (Utah 1943) affirmed a verdict for the insurance
company.

The insured, a doctor, denied having any physical

defects whereas,
the right eye.

in fact, he had lost 80% of the vision in
He later lost the remaining 20% and made

claim against the company.
"true in the general sense."

He claimed his answers were
It was held that his conten-

tion was not sufficient as he knew, or should have known,
that the company may not want to insure his right eye which
already was damaged.

The doctor had read the application.

In Farrington v. Granite State Fire Ins. Co., 232 P.2d
754 (Utah 1951) a verdict for the insured was affirmed.

The

company had claimed a misrepresentation regarding the nature
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of the use of the building.

However, the evidence was that

the plaintiff had advised the defendant's agent of the
change of use after the issuance of the policy but prior to
the loss, and thus knowledge of the change of use was
imputed to the company.

The change of use was not shown to

be material and the company accepted premiums after knowledge of all material facts.
In 1954 the Tenth Circuit affirmed a jury verdict
in favor of an insured in Prudential Ins. Co. of America
v. Willsey, 214 F.2d 729 (10th Cir. 1954).

The jury found,

and the evidence supported a finding that the insured had
made full disclosure, that the agent may or may not have
written the appropriate answers on the application, and the
insured had not read the application before signing it.
Wooton v. Combined Ins. Co. of America, 395 P.2d 724
(Utah 1964) affirmed a summary judgment in favor of the
insured.

The company had claimed misrepresentations as to

the insured's health, that is that he had had polio, walked
with a limp and had retired from his job.
when he was run over by a car.

The insured died

The evidence was, however,

that the company's agent knew that the insured limped, and
that he had had polio as a child.

He in fact was fully

recovered from the polio except for the limp.

There was

no evidence of materiality since the death was in no related
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to the physical defect and in any event the company had
expressly excluded coverage for polio or any residual
paralysis.
In Theros v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 407 P.2d
685 (Utah 1965) the insured, when applying for life insurance, had denied any lost time from work, heart disease, or
medical treatment for heart disease.

In fact, he had been

hospitalized for a heart attack two years before applying
for insurance and had been told of his heart problem by his
doctors.

The insured did, however, make full disclosure of

those facts to the agent who falsely recorded the insured's
answers.

The Supreme Court held, however, that the insured

was duty bound to read the application, that he had signed
it and was bound by the answers.

He permitted false infor-

mation to be submitted to the company.

The court adopted

the majority view that the insured is bound by misstatements
appearing in an application, particularly where he had an
opportunity to read the application and had signed it.

The

court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the insurance
company.
The Supreme Court affirmed a judgment for the insured
in Pritchett v. Equitable Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 421 P.2d
943 (Utah 1966).

The company claimed that the insured had

failed to disclose that she had cancer.

However, there was
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no evidence that she had cancer at the time that she applied
for insurance.

It was claimed that she should have told the

company about a prior stomach problem.

However, the evidence

showed that the company (had it known) would merely have
excluded coverage for stomach problems and still would have
been liable for cancer.

Thus, there was no showing of

materiality.
In Marks v. Continental

Casualt~,

427 P.2d 387

(Utah 1967) a judgment in favor of the insured was sustained.

The company had claimed that the insured had

concealed partial paralysis of the left arm occurring six
years before the application and the removal of her "tailbone" nine years before.

The Supreme Court sustained the

judgment of the trial court for it appeared that the agent
was her brother-in-law and he well knew her past medical
history.

She did not read the application and, in fact,

signed it in blank and mailed it to her brother-in-law.

It

also appeared that the application did not contain any
language near the signature line to the effect that the
applicant had read the foregoing answers and that they are
true and correct.

It further appeared that the misrepre-

sentation, if any, was not material as no relationship
appeared between the prior medical problems and the actual
back operation for which claim was made.
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Utah Supreme Court reversed a summary judgment in favor
of the insurance company in Burnham v. Bankers Life & Cas.
Co., 470 P.2d 261

(Utah 1970), where the court found that

the policy was not contestable since it was a reinstatement
of a prior policy.

Thus, the alleged misrepresentation was

not material to the court's decision, however,

in dicta

Justice Callister observed that it was very questionable
whether the insured's visits with a psychiatrist, for
marriage counseling, were in fact material to the risk.

He

further noted that summary judgment should not have been
granted for the insurance company based upon a self-serving
affidavit from the insurance company's defense attorney that
the company would not have reinstated the policy if they had
known of the visits with the psychiatrist.

Judge Callister

restates what appears to be the state of the law with regard
to cases of this nature:
First, unless the misrepresentations in the
negotiation for an insurance policy are made with
intent to deceive and materially affect either the
acceptance of the risk or the hazard assumed by
the insurer, the insurance contract cannot be
avoided by an insurance company.
Mere falsity of
answers to questions propounded are insufficient
if not knowingly made with intent to deceive and
defraud.
Second, whether or not a misstatement in
an application is material to the risk, while it
is for the jury to determine, depends not upon
what the insurer or the insured may think about
the materiality or the importance of the false
information given or the true information withheld, but upon what those engaged in the insurance
business, acting reasonably and naturally in

-34-
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accord~nce with the usual practice among insurance
companies under such circumstances, would have
done had they known the truth; that is, whether
reasonably careful and intelligent men would have
regarded the facts stated as substantially increasing the chances of the happening of the event
insured against so as to cause a rejection of the
application. 470 P.2d at 263.

In Moore v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 491 P.2d
227 (Utah 1971), the Supreme Court affirmed a jury verdict
in favor of the plaintiff.

The company contended that the

plaintiff's decedent had misstated his medical history, that
is that he had failed to disclose a prior condition diagnosed as "cataplexy•, a rather rare condition for which
there is no known medical explanation.

The insured later

died of a heart attack, and there was no evidence that the
heart attack was in any way related to cataplexy.

A witness

for the insurance company testified that if the company had
known about the cataplexy it would not have issued the
policy, a contention which the jury evidently rejected.

The

Supreme Court affirmed the verdict in favor of the insured
observing that it was the company's burden to prove to the
jury that it would not have issued the policy but that the
jury was certainly not required to believe the company's
witness which was "suffused with self-interest."

Reasonable

minds might differ as to whether the company in fact would
have issued the policy, even if they had known of the preexisting medical problem.
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The following general principles of law may be distilled from the above-cited cases.
(1)

An insurance company may void a policy of insur-

ance where the applicant intentionally misrepresents certain
facts which may affect the acceptance of the risk or the
hazard assumed by the insurer.
(2)

Whether an applicant in fact knew that the misrep-

resentation was being made is a factual question.
(3)

Whether the applicant intended to defraud the

insurance company is a factual question.
(4)

Some misrepresentations, which are borderline, may

or may not be material to the risk.

In such a case,

it is a

factual question whether the company would, or would not
have,

issued the policy.
(5)

Some misrepresentations rise to

importance that,

SUL~

a level of

if it can be established that the insured

knew that the misrepresentation was being made, the court
will hold the misrepresentation to be material as a matter
of law, Eklund v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. and Fidelity &
Casualty Co. of New York v. Middlemiss, supra.
(6)

An insured who reads and signs the application is

bound by the answers therein, and will not be excused by
claiming that the agent wrote down the wrong information,
Theros v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., supra.

-36-
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Failure to disclose prior cancellations is one of
the more serious misrepresentations which may be made in
applying for insurance.

Only one case interpreting Utah law

directly deals with that question (North American Accident
Ins. Co. v. Tebbs, supra), which affirmed a verdict against
the company, but only where the jury specifically found that
the insured did not know that he had previously been declined by another company.

Many cases hold that where the

insured in fact knew of the prior cancellation, such a
misrepresentation is material as a matter of law.
In Globe Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Still, 376 F.2d
611 (5th Cir. 1967) the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
applied a Georgia statute identical to §31-19-8, Utah Code
Annotated (1953, as amended) to facts nearly identical to
those undisputed in the present case.

Three applications

for life, accident and health insurance on defendant Still
were taken at his home by plaintiff's agent.

The agent

asked the questions contained in the applications and
recorded the defendant's responses.
signed the applications.

Defendant Still then

One of the applications inquired

as to whether any insurer had ever declined an application
by defendant Still or cancelled his insurance.
recorded by the plaintiff's agent was "no".

The answer

As a matter of

fact, another insurance company had previously cancelled a
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health and accident policy issued to defendant Still and had
on two occasions declined his application for insurance.
The District Court submitted the issue of material misrepresentation to the jury, but the Circuit Court reversed
holding:
[I]t was error to submit to the jury the
question of whether there was a false representation in the application for policy number 84
concerning insurance that was cancelled and applications that were declined by other companies.

* * *
With respect to the denial of the cancellation of other insurance and declined applications
in the application for policy number 84, it is
uncontradicted that Still signed the application
after it had been completed by the agent.
He was
bound by the answers that there had been no cancellations of insurance or applications declined
by other companies.
The evidence in this case is clear that
despite the statement on the application Still
had, in fact, been cancelled and declined by
another company.
Under the law of Georgia such a
false statement about rejection or cancellation of
other insurance is a material misrepresentation
and voids the policy as a matter of law.
(Citations omitted).
It was thus not a proper matter
for jury resolution.
Id. at 613 and 614.
In First Nat. Bene. Soc. v. Fiske, 101 P.2d 205
(Arizona 1940) the trial court submitted to a jury the
question of whether the insured's failure to list in the
application all insurance companies which had previously
rejected his applications was a material misrepresentation.

-38-
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The Arizona Supreme Court quoted from a previous opinion of
that Court and held:
. • • [W]here an application with its Answers
becomes a part of a policy, as it did in this
case, a statement therein by the applicant that he
has never been denied insurance is as a matter of
law material and, if false, voids the policy at
the option of the insurer. This rule is accepted
by practically all the courts and in our view
rests upon a sound basis because disclosure of the
fact that one applying for a policy has been
rejected by another company immediately suggests
that he is probably not a good risk and undoubtedly leads to a more careful and thorough examination than would be true in the case of one whose
application had not been rejected. It not only
informs the company whether other insurers have
regarded him as unsafe, and places it, so to
speak, upon inquiry, but may advise it as to any
anxiety for insurance the applicant may have.
(Emphasis added). Id. at 206 and 207.
See also, Safeco Insurance Company of America v. Gonacha,
350 P.2d 189 (Colorado 1960) where the Colorado Supreme
Court reversed the trial court and held that misrepresentations regarding prior cancellations are material to the
risk as a matter of law.
The appellant argues that the District Court erred
in refusing to apply an industry standard in determining
the materiality of the misrepresentations.

Appellant cites

Burnham v. Bankers Life & Cas., supra, as authority for the
proposition that the court must apply an industry standard.
Burnham, of course, notes that whether a misstatement is
material is for the jury (or the finder of fact) to determine.
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Burnham and Moore v. Prudential, supra, should be read only
as requiring evidence of industry practice only where the
particular company involved does not have a definite written
rule.

In the instant case, of course, the rule was in

writing and clearly set forth in Exhibit P-6.

In any event,

there was in fact evidence of the industry standard, put on
through the testimony of Mr. Zimmerman, whom the court,
unlike the jury in Moore v. Prudential, chose to believe.
In addition, the court made a specific finding that the
plaintiff herein would not have insured the defendant, not
only because of the written rule, but also in accordance
with the usual industry practice.

Defendant made no attempt

at the time of trial to put on any evidence that other insurance companies would have insured the defendant if they
had known of the prior cancellation.
CONCLUSION
The court found, and the evidence supported, that the
defendant knowingly misrepresented his past insurance
history to the plaintiff and that the plaintiff would not
have insured him if it had known the true facts.

The court

found, and the evidence supports, that the defendant's
misrepresentations were intentional, fraudulent and calculated to mislead the plaintiff.

All of the court's

findings are fully supported by competent evidence.
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The

court's conclusions are consistent with, and indeed mandated by, the statutes of the state of Utah and the prior
decisions of this Court.
The findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment
of the District Court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this

[Q~ day

of August, 1979.

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

:·11 !)
By_-""::::'~

Allan L:--Lats n
Attorneys for~PlaintiffRespondent
700 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 521-9000

Co~ies of .the f~egoing
mailed this ~ day of
August, 1979, to:

D. Sanford Jorgensen
Mooney, Jorgensen & Nakamura
356 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for DefendantAppellant
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